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ABSTRACT
Most search engines can potentially infer the preferences and
interests of a user based on her history of search queries.
While search engines can use these inferences for a variety of
tasks, including targeted advertisements, such tasks do im-
pose an serious threat to user privacy. In 2006, after AOL
disclosed the search queries of 650,000 users, TrackMeNot
was released as a simple browser extension that sought to
hide user search preferences in a cloud of queries. The first
versions of TrackMeNot, though used extensively in the past
three years, was fairly simplistic in design and did not pro-
vide any strong privacy guarantees. In this paper, we present
the new design and implementation of TrackMeNot, which
address many of the limitations of the first release. Track-
MeNot addresses two basic problems. First, using a model
for characterizing search queries, TrackMeNot provides a
mechanism for obfuscating the search preferences of a user
from a search engine. Second, TrackMeNot prevents the
leakage of information revealing the use of obfuscation to
a search engine via several potential side channels in exist-
ing browsers such as clicks, cookies etc. Finally, we show
that TrackMeNot cannot be detected by current search bot
detection mechanisms and demonstrate the effectiveness of
TrackMeNot in obfuscating user interests by testing its effi-
ciency on a major search engine.
1. INTRODUCTION
Protecting user privacy while providing personalized services
is challenging: information gathered to personalize a service
could be misused and, thus, harm user privacy. Therefore,
the benefit of personalization should be weighed against the
risk of sensitive information disclosure.
Web search is a good illustration of the complexity of provid-
ing a personalized service in a privacy-preserving way. Be-
cause many search queries are too ambiguous to accurately
express user interest, personalized query reformulation is of-
ten used to reduce the searched space. In web search, in-
formation used to reformulate queries is mostly based on
previous user searches. Consequently, to provide person-
alized searches and to identify search patterns, web search
engines keep search logs. These logs pose a real threat to
user privacy since they have the potential to disclose users’
identities along with their potentially sensitive queries.
Because search engines are now utilized to retrieve user-
related information, every query could reveal a fair bit of
information about its issuer. The 2006 AOL log disclosure
illustrated how search logs – even those containing no ex-
plicit personal identifiers – could be analyzed to reveal user
identities. Search engines attempted to address this chal-
lenge by anonymizing logs through different processes [6].
Since the search engine must balance data utility and user
privacy, none of these solutions provide effective privacy pro-
tection. An effective anonymization process should destroy
every link between a user’s queries, thereby ruining any per-
sonalization attempt.
There have been three broad classes of techniques that have
been proposed to enhance the privacy of web search: (a) us-
ing anonymization networks such as ToR [15]; (b) leveraging
private information retrieval techniques [11, 5]; (c) obfuscat-
ing search queries [10, 9]. Each of these classes of techniques
have their own strengths and limitations as we discuss in de-
tail in Section 2. While anonymization networks can hide
the user’s IP address, the user should take caution in pre-
venting personally identifiable information to leak through
several side channels enabled in Web pages and browsers.
In a recent study, 46% of ToR users could be identified with
their Google accounts [4]. A single web page is associated
with several independent streams which further increases the
complexity and delay incurred in using anonymization net-
work based solutions. One of the basic challenges with pri-
vate information retrieval and search obfuscation is the need
to generate fake search queries which look indistinguishable
from genuine search queries. This requires knowledge about
several user query parameters including topics of interest,
timing and frequency, without which it becomes difficult to
provide reasonable privacy guarantees. In addition, both
these class of mechanisms do not handle side-channel at-
tacks where user information leaks through several channels
including clicks, advertisements, cookies.
This paper presents the design of TrackMeNot, a system
that enhances the privacy of web search using search obfus-
cation. TrackMeNot addresses many of many limitations of
the first released version [9] which was primarily designed
as a simple-to-use search obfuscation Firefox extension tool.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
9.
46
77
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
2 S
ep
 20
11
TrackMeNot aims to address two basic problems:
(a) achieve ‘query indistinguishability’ where a search en-
gine cannot distinguish between user queries and obfuscated
queries.
(b) prevent adversaries from using side channels and finger-
prints to identify TMN queries.
While it does not provide an anonymity-style guarantee,
TrackMeNot (TMN) aims to provide Reasonable Doubt guar-
antee that inhibits search engines to infer the true user
search interests. TMN leverages history to mimic user tim-
ings for propagating obfuscated queries and thereby is not
vulnerable to timing analysis. By preventing side channel
leaks, an obfuscator can not be detected by its fingerprint,
an adversary can not estimate the number of user who in-
stalled it. As a result, the Reasonable Doubt protection is
extended to all search engine users, even if they do not ob-
fuscate their respective web search histories.
TMN is implemented as a simple browser extension for Fire-
fox and Google Chrome that is extremely simple to use and
install. From a usability perspective, the biggest advantage
of TrackMeNot is that it retains the conventional brows-
ing behavior and requires no additional infrastructure as
required by anonymization techniques. Users using Track-
MeNot, will observe no noticeable change in their web brows-
ing experience; an important reason why the first release
was very widely used despite its lack of strong guarantees.
We have evaluated TrackMeNot on real search engines and
show that it can both enhance search privacy as well as not
be detected by existing search bot detectors. TrackMeNot
can achieve this guarantee while maintaining a low query
overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 offers
an overview of the mechanisms that enforce search privacy.
Section 3 presents search obfuscation and explains TMN pri-
vacy objectives. Section 4 describes the privacy guarantees
that obfuscation introduces. Section 5 shows how TMN has
been designed to cope with side channel leaks. Section 6
presents TMN implementation and Section 7 presents the
evaluation results of TMN.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the strengths and limitations
of three main approaches for enforcing web search privacy:
anonymity, private information retrieval and search obfus-
cation.
2.1 Anonymity
Anonymizing search queries is the most common approach
for protecting web search privacy. To provide anonymity, it
is first necessary to delete all pieces of information that could
lead to the identification of the issuer. However, anonymity
is not enough to protect privacy, it is also critical to remove
every piece of information that could eventually link user
queries.
While identifiers like the IP address and browser cookies ob-
viously carry identifying information, there are other pieces
of information that could be used to identify users. EFF
recently revealed that the User Agent header and other
browser specific information could be used as a cookie alter-
native for tracking browsers [7]. Because every query leaks
information about its issuer as long as queries belonging to a
user can be linked, the risk of user identification exists. The
disclosure of AOL search logs illustrated that search history
contains enough information to identify a user. It is critical
to remove every piece of information that could link queries
made by a user.
TOR [17] is a multi-hop network that is used to access the
Internet anonymously. Because traffic is relayed by several
nodes before being decrypted and forwarded to the web, it
should not be possible for a node to link the unencrypted
traffic data with the node that sent it to the network. TOR
can be used to access any service on the Internet. Since TOR
hides only a user’s IP address, the user should cautiously re-
move the other identifiers that are created and used by the
service she is accessing to. During a recent experiment on
TOR [4], 46% of the TOR exit node users were connected to
a Google Account. If a user issues all her searches using the
same Google account, a TOR exit node could easily connect
several of the user’s search sessions. Since the number of
exit nodes is limited, it is not unlikely for an exit node to be
used several times by the same user. Therefore, user iden-
tity could be compromised through an inappropriate usage
of TOR to search the web.
Although users could pay attention to the identifiers that are
set by the service they use, a more realistic approach con-
sist of configuring the client to automatically delete these
identifiers. PWS [15] is a Firefox extension that redirects
only web searches through the TOR network. PWS removes
all unnecessary header from the HTTP headers (including
Cookies and User Agent) and filters search result page ac-
tive content to prevent search engines from using web bugs
to track users.
Complete anonymity cannot be assured unless active content
is removed from the search page [15]. In terms of usability,
features that require JavaScript or Flash support (e.g query
suggestion, or video) are systematically disabled. The pri-
vacy protection is not complete since ”click-on”search results
are not anonymized. As soon as the user follows a link, her
traffic is no longer directed through TOR. A search engine
could redirect clicks to another domain, where a user would
not hide its IP address. Actually, some search engines al-
ready redirect clicks (on their own domain) to record them
in user profiles. Even if the click through rate is low, queries
belonging to the same search session might be linked (for
instance, when the same keyword appears in consecutive
queries). Consequently, a click on a search result might re-
veal the IP address that is behind several other queries. The
TOR network [17] effectively hides a user’s IP, but exit nodes
are the Achilles’s Heel of onion routing based networks. Be-
cause they could take advantage of their position to reorder
search results, generate click frauds, or exploit browser vul-
nerabilities. Only few TOR nodes accept to be used as exit
nodes since they might be held as responsible for the traffic
they forward on the Internet. Some exit nodes are already
known and blacklisted by search engines and can no longer
be used to route search traffic. Most exit nodes are used by
a large number of users and generate a significant number
of searches. Therefore, TOR users often receive CAPTCHA
to verify that they are not bot generating traffic. Further-
more, routing search queries through the anonymous TOR
network significantly increases the delay from 0.5 to about
10 seconds on average [11]. This high latency is caused by
the TOR network to prevent time analysis.
To get rid of these additional delays, the Firefox extension
GoogleSharing redirects user search traffic through a sin-
gle hop before forwarding it to Google. The GoogleSharing
network is composed of proxies maintained by volunteers.
Because GoogleSharing now supports SSL, proxies do not
have to be trusted. GoogleSharing proxies maintain a pool
of Google Cookie IDs that are sent with search queries. Since
the previous searches made from these IDs are taken into
consideration to rank search results, it is very likely that
the user will receive personalized results not matching her
own, but, instead those of other proxy users.
2.2 Private Information Retrieval
A Private Information Retrieval protocol queries the i-th
tuple of a database without clearly disclosing i. Private In-
formation Retrieval protocols to protect search privacy have
been recently proposed in [11, 5]. To hide a search query
qi, these protocols first compute a set of queries q1,q2,...,qn
and then submit to the search engine: Q=q1 OR q2 ... OR
qi OR ... OR qn. Search engine results that are not related
to qi are discarded on the client side, and the filtered search
result page is ‘then displayed.
The challenge of implementing a PIR protocol is to gener-
ate keywords that are as plausible as the user keywords. If
q1,q2,...,qn have similar frequencies than qi, a search engine
could not guess which of the k queries is the user’s[11]. How-
ever, the average query frequency is not relevant when the
search engine can rely on the past search history to discard
queries that are not consistent with the previous search be-
havior. This issue is partially addressed in [5] which calls
for generating queries related to different topics in order to
prevent user profiling. The user query qi is also replaced by
a query that is likely to return the same results, so it cannot
be identified by the queried engine.
PIR protocol adapted to web search assumes pre-computation
of plausible queries. This computation requires significant
knowledge of the queried database. Misspelled queries are
particularly complex to hide since the researched term should
be fixed. Furthermore, the particular pattern of PIR (con-
taining many “OR”) reveals the PIR protocol user base to
search engines.
2.3 Obfuscation
Obfuscation injects artificially-generated data into the set
of data to protect. Unlike solutions mentioned above, ob-
fuscation cannot protect a particular data but, instead, can
reduce the probability that each data is made by a user. It
is critical for the obfuscator to generate data that cannot
be distinguished from user data. For instance, to hide the
driving habits of drivers, realistic data are generated from
traces provided by GPS driver records [12] or trip planners
[3]. Authors of [3] made a qualitative evaluation of their ap-
proach and obtained good results against human adversaries.
TrackMeNot [10, 9] is a browser extension that enforces pri-
vacy through obfuscation: TMN frequently queries a search
engine to mask real user’s queries.
2.3.1 TrackMeNot initial design flaw
The very first release of TMN has received criticisms [16].
Although all these criticisms have been addressed in the fol-
lowing month, we report them to emphasize the progress
that has been made since the release of the first version.
Number of words in the Dictionary: The first released ver-
sion of TMN used a static list of keywords to generate search
queries. Therefore, a search engine knew that any search
that was not in this dictionary had to be user’s search.
Keywords specialization: To cover a large set of possible
queries, TMN used a large set of keywords that were not
topic-focused. TMN obfuscation was similar to random noise
and could be filtered without losing much information about
user profiles.
Bandwidth consumption: In 2006, bandwidth was a more
critical resource than it is now. TMN bandwidth consump-
tion was relatively high and could degrade the user’s brows-
ing experience. Although TMN bandwidth consumption has
slightly increased, the impact is now negligible compared
to common web browsing activities. Loading a simple web
page generates many queries to ad content networks, some of
them (like videos or flash animations) consume more band-
width than a TMN query.
2.3.2 Attack against TMN
In [13] authors use Machine Learning techniques to filter
TrackMeNot searches. Although the filter performs a very
well and identifies TMN search queries with very high pre-
cision, it also classifies, on average, half of user queries as
made by TMN. It is worth noting that in all of the instances
in which TMN was attacked the same default settings were
used and browsers were never restarted during the attack,
thereby preventing TMN from updating the keywords list
through the RSS feed. Since this attack, TMN has been
updated to include more feeds, as well as randomly click-on
query suggestion. This type of attack would, therefore, be
even less effective against the new version of TMN.
2.4 PIR and Obfuscation comparison
PIR protocols and the obfuscation scheme seem similar as
they send obfuscating queries to protect user’s privacy. Be-
yond this similarity, these approaches have different objec-
tives and constraints. We emphasized these differences in
the particular context of web search privacy.
To hide the query qi, PIR protocols submit a composed
query Q=q1 OR q2 ... OR qi OR ... OR qn. Instead of
sending one long query, an obfuscator sends sequentially q1,
then q2,.. then qi ... and qn. What seems to be a technical
detail has in fact fundamental consequences: a PIR protocol
only protects the search privacy of people using it whereas
an obfuscator protects the privacy of every search engine
user; even those that do not use it. With a PIR protocol,
a user cannot pretend that she did not issue qi unless she
issued “q1 OR q2 ... OR qi OR ... OR qn”. On the other
hand, she could argue that qi is an obfuscating query even
if she never used an obfuscator.
PIR protocols prevent a search engine from filtering key-
words through a time analysis. Nevertheless, time analysis
could still reveal a bit of information that could be used to
profile users. For instance, recognizing search timing pat-
tern in a large community of users could let the search en-
gine to determine the events a user is attending when she is
not making her regular searches. Such information could re-
veal critical details such as user religion or political opinion.
Furthermore, with obfuscation, incertitude can be total; it
is plausible that all user queries have been generated by the
obfuscator, but it is also possible that none of them have.
On the other hand, with PIR, the adversary knows that 1
out of n queries is the user’s.
In the next section, we leverage this incertitude to protect
search privacy. Although one may fear that a large adoption
of TMN would cause a flood of queries on search engines,
Section 4 demonstrates that a popular obfuscator could pro-
vide Privacy beyond a Reasonable Doubt by sending a neg-
ligible number of queries.
3. TRACKMENOT SEARCH OBFUSCATION
The basic design philosophy of TrackMeNot is to achieve
two objectives:
Query Indistinguishability: A search engine should be unable
to distinguish genuine user queries and obfuscated queries.
Side channel leakage prevention: Prevent systematic identi-
fication of TMN queries based on fingerprints.
In this section we only focus on query indistinguishability
and deal with side channel leakage in Section 5. In the ab-
sence of any side channel leaks, a user from the perspective
of a search engine can be characterized only using a string
of search queries. The basic goal of search obfuscation is
to achieve query indistinguishability to make it difficult for
a search engine to distinguish between genuine and obfus-
cated queries. In other words, search obfuscation makes the
analysis of one’s search history hard enough to dissuade any
community like AOL Stalker [1] from identifying query is-
suers.
We assume that the search engine may use three basic forms
of data analysis to potentially distinguish user requests from
obfuscated requests: (a) topic based analysis; (b) timing
based analysis; (c) frequency based analysis. In topic based
analysis, a search engine can categorize search requests across
different topics and use data mining analysis across history
to identify user specific topics. Timing based analysis lever-
age timing information of user requests and frequency based
analysis leverages frequency of requests across topics and
query popularity on the Web.
Query indistinguishability is fundamentally different from
traditional anonymity models in that while anonymization
tries to destroy every link between the user and her search
queries, obfuscation makes these links less valuable by dilut-
ing them. Even in the face of query indistinguishability, a
search engine can learn a basic set of features about the user
such as: login name, IP address. From a privacy perspec-
tive, we are only aiming to hide the user queries and specific
user interests but not all the user’s credentials.
Search engines publish a broad category of fairly general top-
ics such as “Entertainment”, “Travel” etc. across which they
classify information sources. We assume that there exists
a universe U of general topics that is publicly available; in
fact, our implementation leverages one such universe of 600
topics from the Yahoo profiles. TrackMeNot can be tailored
to support one of two types of Query indistinguishability
models:
Topic-exposed Query indistinguishability: A user search queries
span m broad topics T1, . . . Tm. In topic-exposed query in-
distinguishability, the search engine can easily infer the m
broad topics of interest of a user but will be unable to dis-
tinguish genuine and obfuscated queries within these topics.
In this case, the obfuscated queries are generated across the
same broad topics as the original topics.
Topic-obfuscated Query indistinguishability: In this model,
we aim to both provide query indistinguishability as well as
hide the user search interests across a larger set of n topics
where n > m.
We make two important observations. First, the topic-exposed
model is a realistic model since most of the published search-
engine profiles are across very broad topics where reveal-
ing a user interest on a broad topic may not convey much
to a search engine about specific user interests within the
topic. Second, topic-exposed query indistinguishability is
much easier to achieve which a much smaller set of queries
in comparison to topic-obfuscated query indistinguishabil-
ity. To achieve topic-obfuscated query indistinguishability
in the face of frequency, timing and topic analysis incurs a
much higher query overhead.
3.1 Topic-exposed Query Indistinguishability
In this model, TrackMeNot aims to protect against frequency
and timing based analysis of search queries. The solution
approach of TMN is to consider a universe U of topics as
published by search engines such as Yahoo! which classify
user profile across a specified set of topics. Given U , TMN
learns the genuine user profile of topics, and issues obfus-
cated queries within the same topics. To identify candidate
queries, TMN uses a large online repository of RSS feeds.
TMN pre-classifies and pre-identifies the topic of each RSS
feed across the universe U . TMN identifies a set of RSS
feeds corresponding to the user search interests and allows
the user to pick her favorite RSS feeds within the set. The
next step is to identify n-grams from the chosen RSS feeds
as candidate obfuscation queries.
Frequency analysis: To thwart basic forms of frequency
analysis from a search engine, TMN maintains a frequency
profile (as a cumulative distribution) across three granular-
ities: frequency of queries across topics, frequency of key-
words within topics and relative popularity of query n-grams.
Across these three dimensions, TMN maintains an obfusca-
tion profile which has a similar relative frequency profile
across topics and across keywords within topics. To ob-
fuscate specific keywords which may be used repetitively
across queries, TMN leverages a set of obfuscated keywords
and follows a similar frequency pattern as the original key-
words. TMN could also measure the relative popularity of
the n−gram using published datasets such as the Linguistic
Data Consortium (LDC) and generate obfuscated queries
which have similar relative frequencies. To model the case
where user interests may change with time, TMN can main-
tain the user topic profile as a sliding window.
Timing analysis: TMN uses user’s history to be resilient to
timing analysis. The frequency of TMN obfuscation queries
is comparable if not less than the frequency of genuine user
queries. TMN maintains a weekly and daily profiles of tim-
ing information of user requests and attempts to approxi-
mately replicate both the timing and the inter-arrival times
across genuine user requests to issue obfuscated requests; ex-
act replication does expose TMN to timing analysis – hence
we add a certain amount of randomness to the inter-arrival
times. In addition, TMN maintains active and inactive pe-
riods of users and issues queries only during active periods;
TMN is activated only when the browser is active. To han-
dle the temporal correlation across queries, TMN does not
intersperse obfuscated queries with a temporally correlated
stream of queries from a user on a single topic. Using the
distribution of temporal correction across real queries, TMN
can correspondingly issue a temporally correlated stream of
obfuscated queries across target topics.
3.2 Topic obfuscation
In topic-obfuscated query indistinguishability, TMN needs
to both infer the user topic interests as well as construct
a list of obfuscation topics to hide the user topics. Given
the universe U of topics as published by a search engine,
consider a user whose search requests span m topics. We
use an approach similar to [5] to identify a target list of n
topics for each user across which we anonymize the genuine
m topics. To generate obfuscated queries on target topics,
TMN uses the user-defined list of RSS feeds across the tar-
get topics. Most RSS feeds are topic focused and one can
find RSS about a given topic very easily using a RSS search
engine such as Google Reader or use a Twitter search about
a particular topic. Because RSS feeds are dynamic and more
reflective of real-time trends, we extract keywords from these
feeds to construct queries. We believe RSS-feeds based TMN
queries are more likely to follow search trends than using any
static corpus. To identify keywords in an RSS feed, TMN
focuses on RSS titles and then extracts words starting with
or containing a capital letter. Capital letter starting words
are either names or words which have been emphasized by
the web content writers because they are highly informa-
tive about the article content. Therefore, instead of using
complex artificial intelligence and semantical analysis, TMN
leverages content writers information analysis to distinguish
valuable keywords. TMN allows users to choose the n tar-
get topics and the corresponding RSS feeds to obfuscate her
queries; this allows user-customization in the search obfus-
cation process.
To handle frequency analysis in this model, TMN should
choose a list of target obfuscated topics that emulate both
long term interest topics as well as time-varying interests.
If analysis of user search behavior reflects that some in-
terests are expressed at a constant frequency (e.g: a user
checking every week sports results), TMN should provide
obfuscation queries about (at least) one target topic that is
similarly distributed in time. Similarly, different topics may
have slightly varying frequencies of query requests; for each
frequency range, TMN chooses at least one target topic to
emulate a similar frequency pattern.
In the topic obfuscation model, TMN needs to choose at
least one obfuscation topic to hide a real user topic and hence
the number of queries may be much higher than the topic
exposed model. In general, we note that achieving strong
privacy guarantees in the topic obfuscation model in the face
of a powerful oracle is fundamentally hard. If the obfusca-
tion topic and the actual topic have fundamentally differ-
ent semantics, providing absolute guarantees across topics
is impossible and one would need a strong computational
linguistic model to argue the strengths and limitations of
search obfuscation. What TMN tries to defend against is
only against a simplistic query analysis model which we be-
lieve is reflective of current search engine practices [19].
4. ADVERSARY MODELS AND PRIVACY
GUARANTEES
In this section, we define three types of attacks that match
different adversaries and give an explanation of the mitiga-
tion of TMN against these adversaries.
4.1 Adversary Model
We consider an obfuscator taking as input H={q1,q2,...,qY }
and outputting OH={q1,q2,...,qY , qY+1,...qY+X} . The ob-
Table 1: Notation
Name Description
Gqi The event qi is generated
Aqi The event qi is flagged as generated
P(Aqi) Probability for qi to be flagged
as artificial (Aqi=1)
Ob The user is suspected to obfuscate her searches
pOb Probability that the user is suspected
to obfuscate her searches (P(Ob))
X˜ Estimated number of artificial queries
Y˜ Estimated number of user queries
X Number of artificial queries
Y Number of user queries
fuscated search history OH contains Y real queries and X
decoys.
The adversary aims at de-obfuscating the search history by
filtering the X decoys. The adversary just knows the numer
of submited queries X+Y but does not know the values
X and Y. For each query qi in OH, the adversary computes
P(Aqi). It is important to notice that P(Aqi) is not the prob-
ability that qi is artificial but, rather the probability that it
is flagged as artificial. Similarly, P(Ob) is not the probabil-
ity that the user is obfuscating his search but, rather, the
probability that the obfuscation will be suspected.
We consider three types of attacks that differ on their ob-
jectives and the resources and knowledge that the attacker
has with regard to the victim.
4.1.1 Attack I based on a single query
The attacker considers a specific query in the search history
of a user and evaluates it if this query has been issued by
TMN or by the user himself. This kind of attack is typically
prevented by covering any potential side channel that would
let the attacker know with certitude that a query has been
made by the user. This attack could be run by an adversary
trying to establish the list of users who have issued a specific
query.
4.1.2 Attack II based on a query set
The set of queries issued by a user account is analyzed, and
the queries are filtered based on the probability that they
have been issued by the user. The attacker fixes an arbi-
trary threshold and filters all the queries that it considers
generated. In this attack scenario, the attack can try to
detect user search sessions to improve filter performances.
This attack can be performed by a de-anonymizing attacker
trying to find the identity of someone having issued the set
of searches. The Machine Learning based attack described
in [13] is an implementation of this attack.
4.1.3 Attack III based on a user profile
The adversary knows a set of new queries and the user pro-
file. The adversary filters these queries based on the likeli-
hood that they have been issued by the user considering his
profile and semantic features. The attacker could then use
this filtered set of queries to update the user profile.
4.2 Generated Query Indistinguishability
An obfuscator provide query indistinguishability if:
∀qi ∈ OH, P (Aqi |Ob ∧Gqi) = P (Aqi |Ob ∧Gqi) =
X˜
(X˜ + Y˜ )
The first release of TMN did not provide Generated Query
Indistinguishability. Indeed, search queries that are associ-
ated to suggest queries could not have been generated by
TMN and, therefore, a user could not have claimed that
they had been issued by the obfuscator.
This occur when no feature can distinguish a real query from
a generated one. If the obfuscator has this property, the
search history is protected against Attack I.
To use this with regard to semantic features, one could ap-
ply the method proposed by [5] to generate keywords that
can be connected to targeted categories by the search engine
profiling system. In Section 5, the implementation details
illustrate how TMN handles side channel attacks.
4.3 Reasonable Doubt
 is the Reasonable Doubt that cannot be tolerated when
accusing a user to issuing a query. Obfuscation achieves the
Reasonable Doubt  objective if:
∀qi ∈ H, P (Aqi ∧Ob) ≥  (1)
If the obfuscator reaches the Reasonable Doubt, there should
be no query in user search history that she cannot claim as
artificial.
4.3.1 -overhead Obfuscation
We create a condition for an obfuscator providing Generated
Query Indistinguishability to provide Reasonable Doubt. Ap-
plying Law of Total Probability , we have:
P (Aqi ∧Ob) = P (Aqi |Ob).pob + P (Aqi |Ob).pob (2)
P (Aqi |Ob) is the probability for query qi to be flagged as
generated by the adversary supposing that the latter does
not obfuscate her searches. Therefore, P (Aqi |Ob) = 0 and
P (Aqi ∧Ob) = P (Aqi |Ob).pob (3)
Assuming Generated Query Indistinguishability property:
P (Aqi ∧Ob) =
pob.X˜
(X˜ + Y˜ )
(4)
Therefore, Reasonable Doubt is equivalent to
∀qi ∈ H, X˜
(X˜ + Y˜ )
.pob ≥ 
⇔ X˜ ≥ Y˜ .
(pob − )
(5)
Furthermore, X + Y = X˜ + Y˜
(5)⇔ X + Y − Y˜ ≥ Y˜ .
(pob − )
⇔ X ≥ Y˜ . pob
(pob − ) − Y
(6)
The number of queries to generated is not proportional to
the number of user queries, but rather to the estimated num-
ber of user queries.
4.3.2 Reasonable Doubt against conservative adver-
sary
Because an adversary should not be capable of evaluating
either X or pob ( properties not provided by PIR since both
the use and the number of generated queries are disclosed)
an obfuscator can leverage this uncertainty and force adver-
saries to consider that each query is artificial. A conserva-
tive adversary especially cannot tolerate having a generated
query flagged as human generated. Considering the exam-
ple of the crowd de anonymizing search logs, information
extracted from an artificial query could accuse the wrong
user.
If the obfuscator cannot be identified by bogus queries, the
adversary ignores who is obfuscating its search history. pob
should be the same for every user and is based on obfusca-
tor popularity. The more popular the obfuscation the fewer
queries have to be issued because pob increases. Assum-
ing that obfuscation becomes the norm (for example, if it
becomes standard in major browsers), a conservative adver-
sary should assume p˜ob = 1.
An adversary is only capable of observing X+Y. To prevent
an adversary from estimating X, the number of generated
queries should be completely random for each user and, but,
follow a realistic time distribution. Xmin, especially should
not be too high to prevent the detection of user which are
not obfuscating their searches (those that generate less than
Xmin queries) and Xmax should not be too low or the ad-
versary would know that X+Y-Xmax queries are real. Un-
der such assumptions, a conservative adversary that cannot
measure X should estimate: Y˜ = 1 . Therefore, if the ob-
fuscator is popular enough for the conservative adversary to
estimate that every one may utilize it, Reasonable Doubt 
is guaranteed even with X = 0. Consequently, a popular ob-
fuscator providing the Generated Query Indistinguishability
property would grant a reasonable doubt to every search en-
gine user – even to those that do not obfuscate their searches.
4.4 (α,β) Resiliency
For a filter F, the true negative rate is given by
TNR =
Tn
(Tn+ Fn)
(7)
TNR is the user query ratio in the complete set of filtered
queries. We say that the search obfuscator is α resilient for
0<α<1 if, in order to filter the generated query with a TNR
≥β, the search engine should drop at least α of the real
query.
It estimates what it would cost the search engine in terms
of user queries to remove the noise. Since the search en-
gine can tolerate a certain volume of noise in user search
history, it does not have to drop queries unless the amount
of noise is beyond what it is acceptable. We denote by β
this acceptable volume of noise. Intuitively, β should be
small, otherwise the search engine could infer false infor-
mation from the profile. The (α,β) Resiliency protects the
user against Attack II by forcing the attacker to drop legiti-
mate queries. This property could also mitigate Attack III,
though it cannot take into consideration the user’s profile.
The results obtained in [13] illustrates TMN resiliency.
5. PREVENTING SIDE CHANNEL LEAKS
Even if generated queries are semantically similar to user
queries, technical features could allow search engines to iden-
tify some user queries. In this section, we provide an exhaus-
tive list of technical details and patterns that could leak in-
formation about real queries. Then, we explain how these
leaks are prevented by TMN.
5.1 Side Channels
Search timing is user-specific and varies according to the
hour and the day; TMN queries should have a similar time
distribution.
The HTTP header contains information about the browser,
user operating environment and preference and the URL of
the last visited website. These fields must be carefully set
by TMN to correspond to those of regular queries. New fea-
tures and advanced search interfaces also introduce new side
channels that could be used to identify user interactions. To
display the search result page, the browser downloads many
elements, each of which is obtained through a separate re-
quest; these requests should be made also when the query is
artificial.
Active content embedded in search result pages is used to
enhance search interface with features such as search sugges-
tions. If the obfuscator does not handle active content like
the user, the search engine could identify obfuscating queries
via technical features. Furthermore, these new features are
utilized by the user and should be similarly used by TMN.
The set of all interactions that a user can have with a search
engine and that are recorded should be supported by TMN.
Finally if TMN does not generate clicks on search results,
a search engine could identify searches followed by clicks as
user searches. In the rest of this section, we detail how TMN
prevents the use of side channels to filter artificial queries.
5.2 Query scheduling
TMN is integrated with the browser and does not run as a
standalone program. As a result, TMN does not generate
queries unless the browser is actually open. ‘Query Bursts’
are triggered whenever a real search is issued, thus making
it harder for a search engine to evaluate search patterns.
To improve search scheduling, TMN can analyze the browser
search history (by querying the local history) or web search
history (by parsing the web search history webpage) and
identify search patterns in order to map them.
5.3 HTTP Header
Miscomputed Cookie and User Agent headers could be used
to flag TMN queries. Since queries are issued from a user’s
browser, Agent and Cookies are computed by the browser
and not by the obfuscator, thereby preventing computation
error.
url: TMN uses Regular Expression to catch the search URL
and then use this URL to issue new queries. Therefore, when
user queries a local version of a search engine, TMN queries
the exactly same URL.
referrer: If two consecutive TMN queries are issued on the
same search engine, the referrer of the second query is the
URL of the first query result page. Otherwise, the referrer
is set to the URL of the last website ‘visited’ by TMN after
a click through. The referrer is never set according to the
websites that a user visits. Otherwise, TMN would leak
information about user browsing sessions.
5.4 External element downloading
TMN loads the search result page in a collapsed browser
element. Every element of the result page is downloaded as
if it were displayed in a tab. Fingerprints that TMN queries
leave in search engine logs are the same as these user queries.
Therefore, even by correlating search and request on content
hosting servers, search engines cannot filter artificial queries.
5.5 Favicon
On a browser tab, a favicon is also displayed along the ti-
tle of the page. To prevent distinction based on the traffic
pattern, the favicon is downloaded by TMN when the page
is rendered. This icon is rendered in TMN menu bar and
is therefore downloaded as if it was rendered in the location
bar: Firefox checks the cache to see if the icon is available be-
fore downloading it. If a valid entry of the favicon is present
in the cache; it is not downloaded. The search engine can
not use cache information leakage to flag real user queries
either.
5.6 Active Content Handling
In this new version of TMN, active content is supported on
the search result page: the JavaScript embedded in search
result pages is downloaded and then executed in the browser.
This might be a concern if some malicious JavaScript is exe-
cuted by TMN. However, such an event is very unlikely since
the executed JavaScript code comes from the search engine
webpage.
The JavaScript environment in which TMN search results
are interpreted should be the same as the environment used
to interpret user searches. For instance, when a websearch
on Bing is made through an iframe, the javascript embedded
in the result page raises an exception when the code checks
the length of the DOMWindow history element. The search
engine could detect these exceptions and filter TMN search
queries. Therefore, search made by TMN are issued through
a browser element which is similar to the browser used by
the user to submit her queries.
5.7 Query suggestions
Instead of mimicking search traffic, TMN mimics interac-
tions with search engine interfaces. This approach is more
robust and should be less affected by future change to these
interfaces. To implement this, TMN simulates every DOM
event that is monitored on the search engine web page.
These events are the same as those that are triggered by
the user when she is interacting with the search page, thus
making it impossible for the search engine to detect queries
based on the events. When TMN simulates keystrokes in the
search box, query suggestions are automatically requested to
the search engine. Therefore, TMN leaves a normal finger-
print of requests for suggestions on the search engine servers.
5.8 Click Stream
As a real user, TMN sometimes follows search result links
and navigates between search results pages by clicking on
links. To address security concerns that might be raised if
TMN loads untrusted script, TMN never actually downloads
content from clicked URLs.
Clicks on sponsored links are voluntarily prevented not to
interfere with the search engines business model. This could
potentially leak information about user searches but it pre-
vents click fraud abuses. The sole solution is for a user not
to click on sponsored links related to sensitive searches.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
TMN [10] is implemented as an extension of the popular web
browsers Firefox and Google Chrome. It runs as a back-
ground process and, thus, does not significantly impact the
user browsing experience. Current version of TMN can ob-
fuscate search on AOL, Baidu, Bing, Google and Yahoo!.
Since the very first released version, transparency and ease
of use were the values embedded in TMN design.
6.1 Values in Design
TMN is more transparent and lets users see how it acts in
background. By clicking on the Show Frame button, the
user will be presented the browser that submit queries to
search engines. Therefore the user can see the queries as
they are submitted, the result page that is returned by the
search engine and view search result link get colored as TMN
clicks on them. The option window still provides user with
a complete interface letting them select the search engines
that are queried by TMN and set the query frequency. This
frequency is set by default to three queries per hour and per
engine. Users can change this frequency, TMN will include
a feature adapting this frequency to the actual user use of a
search engine. Therefore, search engines will not be able to
notice an increase in the query frequency when a user installs
TMN. The use of RSS feeds to boostrap the list of keywords
that are used by TMN is particularly interesting when users
are able to edit the feeds that TMN uses. Therefore, TMN
includes a editor to add RSS feeds and organize them in
categories. This RSS editor is integrated in Firefox as an
RSS manager. As a result, a user can add a feed to the TMN
RSS list simply by clicking on the RSS logo that appears in
the URL box.
6.2 Setting up an obfuscating profile
In order to set-up an obfuscating profile, users need to select
a set of RSS feeds that are connected to the list of interests
that they want to simulate through TMN. To find a pub-
lished RSS feed related to a particular topic, users could
search on Google Reader for the topic of their choice and
then select one of the results.
A second approach calls for using Twitter as an RSS feed.
This approach can be followed either by setting up a user
account that receives tweets related to the topics or by set-
ting up a search on twitter and outputting the result as a
RSS feed. The user should also configure his RSS feeds in
categories to map the categorization of the profiling search
engine. Users do not show the same level of interest for ev-
ery topic. They are likely to issue more queries about their
preferred topics than about topics that they do not con-
sider very interesting or that are not frequently updated.
TMN should similarly show more interest for certain topics
than others by generating more queries about them. Once
the user has organized his RSS feeds into categories, he’ll
be able to assign weight to topics. A topic with a greater
weight will be the subject of more TMN queries. If the user
does not want to assign weights to topics, TMN will analyze
the browser search history to extract the queries per topic
distribution and use the same distribution.
Figure 1: Bot Features
7. EVALUATION
In this section, we first overview two search bot detection
mechanisms and then evaluate quantitatively and qualita-
tively the resilience of TMN against these mechanisms. TMN
Topic Level Obfuscation is evaluated by examining profiles
established by a search engine.
7.1 Search Bot Detection
7.1.1 Aggressive search bot detection
Description: Buehrer et al[2] analyzed search traffic to
detect obviously non-human search patterns. They distin-
guish two sets of features (see Figure 1). Physical Model
Features reflect a specific traffic patterns while Behavioral
Features are related to the content of the search queries.
Most of these features focus on a property (keyword length,
periodicity, number of keywords...) to evaluate the entropy
of user searches. Any behavior which obviously deviates
from the norm is flagged as suspicious.
TMN Detection: We carry out experimentation and
estimate the score of TMN for every feature that can be
computed. Unfortunately, many features require a large
set of human queries to be observed. To compute a score
for Query Word Entropy, we use the Linguistic Data Con-
sortium (LDC). Computation of Adult Content and Spam
scores, require the list of correspondence (word ,weight).
From the results reported in Figure 1, it appears that TMN
can not be detected through any of the feature discovered by
[2] and that we have been able to observe. Keyword length
entropy is estimated based on the exact same formula that is
used by [2], though the results are not comparable to those
they have obtained.
7.1.2 Distributed search bot detection
Description: Features identified by [2] detect search bots
that expose behavior that is obviously non human. Although
these features detect aggressive search bots, they are inef-
fective against stealth bots that do not expose aberrant be-
havior.
By balancing the load among several members of a Bot-
Net, distributed search bots deceive threshold-based detec-
tion mechanisms. But a brutal variation of search traffic
might be completely legitimate. For instance, the abrupt
interest for Michael Jackson in the few hours following his
death, categorized as suspicious by Google, was actually le-
gitimate.
SBotMiner[19] addresses this challenge in two steps: first
it identifies potential search bots by identifying suspicious
search activity groups. Then Matrix Based Search Detection
removes flash crowds by comparing the entire query/click
history of users in suspicious groups. Those that match per-
fectly are very likely to belong to bots.
Search desobufscation:Whereas the previous Bot Detec-
tion could have been used to identify independently each
bot, SBotMiner is used to identify a BotNet. However,
SBotMiner mechanism is based on the main assumption
that bots are controlled by a remote commander and have
similar search activities. Although search activities of two
TMN users may show some similarities, TMN search activ-
ity should vary very quickly between different users. In fact,
if it is appropriately configured TMN should always gener-
ate user specific without requiring a learning phase. Such
configuration of TMN should not issue the same queries and
therefore should not be considered as suspicious a suspicious
search activity. Therefore, TMN shall not be identified as a
potential BotNet.
7.2 Experiment
The previous analyses tend to show that existing solutions to
detect search bots shall not flag TMN queries as suspicious.
Practically, the use of the obfuscator can not be detected
and no features let a search engine distinguish artificial and
user queries. From the previous result, it is reasonable to
assume that TMN provides query indistinctability.
The next experimentation shows that TMN also provides
Topic Level Obfuscation by evaluating the impact of TMN
queries on the profile established by Yahoo!. The search
engine Yahoo! has been chosen because it lists the interests
that are deduced from user search and browsing history [18].
On this webpage, a user can view the list of interest inferred
from his search history but cannot edit this list of interest.
To the best of our knowledge, Yahoo! is the sole search
engine to provide this list of interest. Other search engines
(like Google) do not seem to select displayed ads based on
user long-term interests [8].
This experiment evaluates the impact of TMN queries on
eight Yahoo! profiles. These profiles do not belong to real
users and have, therefore, not been used before. In this
experiment, each profile is used to send a significant number
of queries related to at least one targeted topic. On average,
180 queries are issued from each profile, with a rate of 3
queries per minute. Every hour, the profile is changed and a
new set of topics is selected; the IP address of the computer
sending the query is also modified. Before presenting the
results of the experiment, we describe in details the tools
used in the experiment.
7.2.1 Experiment Setup
Topic focused query generator: : To demonstrate topic
level obfuscation, we select a list of targeted topics around
which interests are expressed. Both Google and Yahoo! have
published the list of topics they use to categorize user inter-
ests. These lists of topics are broad enough to cover most
user interests. Since we observe the impact of TMN on Ya-
hoo! profiles, the Yahoo! topics list is preferred to establish
a pool of targeted interests. More precisely, we focus on the
14 root categories plus the 7 ‘miscellaneous’ sub-categories
to keep our analysis as broad as possible. Keywords about
one of these topics are generated using the tool proposed by
[14]. This tool submits the name of the topic as a query,
parses the returned documents, and computes TF and IDF
scores of each term occurring in the first thousand retrieved
documents. We keep only rare terms that are specific to the
targeted topic. Each of the eight search profiles focuses on
two random topics. It should be noted that this query gener-
ation process can be replicated by an adversary to build the
list of all obfuscating queries. Therefore this process should
normally be coupled with the RSS based query generation
process which is dependent of users input.
Identity manager: Another Firefox extension has been
developed to simplify cookie management. This extension
identifies the cookie keys that are used to identify users and
stores them. The extension automatically recognizes the
name of the current account by parsing the search page and
then creates a new entry in the local base. This entry con-
tains the name of the account, cookie values and the ran-
domly selected topics. When an account is selected, the
extension replaces the cookie values for the Yahoo! domain
with those corresponding to the new account. Then the ex-
tension replaces the current list of TMN queries by the list
of keywords related to the topic selected for this profile. In
order to obtain significant results over a short period of time,
we raised the query frequency to three queries per minute.
7.2.2 Results extraction
For each profile, we observed the categories and sub cate-
gories that are listed. Because Yahoo! simply lists search
interest without ordering, it is not possible to know the ex-
act shape of the profile. We observed that every profile built
by established by Yahoo! is different. Because all queries
have been issued by TMN, these differences prove that TMN
queries are taken into account to build the profiles. Since
most categories have sub-categories that are also listed in
the list of interests, we approximate the interest that Ya-
hoo! inferred according to the number of subcategories of
the targeted topic that appears in the list. For each test,
two values are computed:
Impact: The number of categories and sub-categories listed
in the profiles that are related to one of the targeted topics
is divided by the overall number of categories related to a
targeted topic. The higher the Impact, the more TMN can
orient the profile. An Impact of 1 would mean that TMN
fully simulates interest for targeted topics.
Precision: The number of categories and sub-categories
listed in the profile that are related to a targeted topics
is divided by the total number of categories and sub cate-
gories listed in the profile. The higher is the Precision, the
more accurate is the topic level obfuscation. If Precision is
1, TMN queries exclusively express an interest for the tar-
geted topics, without affecting any other topic. Result of
the experimentation are provided in Table2
7.2.3 Topic Level Obfuscation Impact
On average, 40% of the sub-categories related to a targeted
topic is present in the list of interest established by Yahoo!;
low results correspond to topics that have only few subcat-
egories (as reported by experiment 2,5,6 and 7). Categories
having more specializations are more likely to have better
performance in terms of Impact. Thus, the method used
to compute the Impact factor might not completely reflect
the deduced interests. For instance, the categories “Gov-
ernment and Military,Romance, Religion and Spirituality,
Politics” have only one sub-category and are therefore less
likely to impact user profile. Although we might have ex-
pected higher values, these results tend to show that queries
generated by TMN impact the categories and sub-categories
that are listed in the Yahoo! profile.
7.2.4 Topic Level Obfuscation Precision
Except for the first experiment, the precision of Topic Level
Obfuscation is very low. Several factors explain these re-
sults. First, for some topics, there are some mismatches
between extracted keywords and the Yahoo! categorization
algorithm. For instance, the set of keywords related to the
topic “Military and Government” ( that was selected in ex-
periments 2) is a list of countries mentioned in document
related to International events. But these country names
have been considered, most of the time, as travel destina-
tions by Yahoo! profiling system adds many entries to the
“Travel” category. Secondly, some categories are to broad
and systematically listed in profiles. The categories “Enter-
tainment”,“Small Business and B2B” and “Travel” are listed
in test result. These categories are probably too common
and could be related to many web searches. Finally, the
Yahoo! profiling system has not been evaluated yet. It is
therefore hard to know how accurate the algorithm is in
identifying user interests.
Table 2: Experimentation Results
Test Impact Precision
1 0.47 0.41
2 0.09 0.03
3 0.50 0.11
4 0.50 0.10
5 0.57 0.12
6 0.35 0.31
7 0.43 0.08
8 0.57 0.44
Average 0.44 0.20
8. CONCLUSION
Many criticisms have been raised against the use of obfus-
cation to protect web search privacy. This paper addresses
most of these criticisms and emphasizes that TMN obfusca-
tion could provide reasonable doubt protection without over-
loading search engines. TMN also addresses several common
side channel leaks that occur in web search. By experiment-
ing TMN with Yahoo! search profiles, we show that TMN
does impact the inferred search profile and effectively hides
user search interests. Evaluation with existing search bot
detection mechanism has revealed that TMN search traffic
should not be flagged as automated. We plan to release the
new version of TMN for web users in the near future.
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